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Introduction
A bureaucracy has a profound impact on 
public policy when it determines eligibility 
for government programs.  Organized 
interest groups can increase the amount of 
information the target population has about 
the program, help applicants with their 
applications, and work to inform policy 
makers when the process is not working 
well.  By doing these things, interest groups 
can affect how government programs are 
implemented. 
In this paper, we investigate the influence 
of veterans’ interest groups on eligibility 
determinations in the Veterans’ Disability 
Compensation (VDC) program across 
the fifty U.S. states to determine whether 
variations in veterans’ organizations can 
explain why VA programs are implemented 
differently across the states.  We find that the 
strength of veterans’ groups affect demand 
for, access to, and effectiveness of the 
Veterans’ Disability Compensation program. 
In states where veterans’ groups have greater 
resources, more veterans file claims, more 
applications are approved, and, interestingly, 
the Veterans’ Administration makes fewer 
errors in their eligibility decisions.  We find 
no evidence, however, that the strength of 
veterans groups explain variation in the 
number of claims that are appealed, the 
percent of claims that are pending over 120 
days, or the average disability rating given to 
successful claimants.  
Importance of the Issue
Veteran’s Disability Compensation is an 
important policy area to examine because the 
effectiveness of the VA’s handling of VDC 
and the distribution of disability benefits has 
been questioned by the Inspector General 
of the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(2005) and the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) (2005).  In 2003, the GAO 
designated the compensation program as 
high-risk due to continuing problems with 
the timeliness and consistency of disability 
decisions (GAO 2005).  The number of 
claims pending over six months increased 
by 61 percent from 2003 to 2005 (GAO 
2005).  Also, there is wide variation in the 
average disability compensation payment per 
veteran across the fifty states with the average 
payments varying from a low of $6,961 in 
Illinois to a high of $12,004 in New Mexico 
in 2004.  These issues have also received the 
attention of the media and elected officials 
(see for example, Adams 2007).
Interest Groups and Eligibility 
Determination 
We look at veterans’ groups to assess 
whether variation in the resources of these 
organizations can explain state differences 
in eligibility determination.  Interest groups 
and agencies have a reciprocal relationship. 
Interest groups are a resource for the 
bureaucracy and help bureaucrats raise 
public awareness of important issues and 
persuade public opinion (Hrebenar 1997). 
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The support of interest groups can help the bureaucracy gain 
autonomy and resources from political principals and help 
agencies secure budgets (Meier and Bohte 2007).  Agencies 
also act as a resource for interest groups and these groups seek 
favorable outcomes for their clients at all stages in the policy 
process (Lowi 1969).    
Veterans’ Disability Compensation Program
Disability compensation is a monthly payment made by the 
VA to veterans with a physical or mental disability that was 
incurred in, or aggravated by, military service.  Under this 
program, the VA attempts to compensate veterans for loss 
of earnings due to service-connected injuries (U.S. Veterans 
Affairs Office of Inspector General 2005).  Compensation 
payments are based on a disability-rating schedule that 
rates disability in ten percent increments from 0 to 100 
percent with the amount of compensation increasing as the 
veteran’s level of disability increases.  Eligibility for disability 
compensation requires that the veteran was discharged or 
released under conditions other than dishonorable and that 
his or her disease or injury was incurred or aggravated in 
the line of duty. Eligibility for disability compensation is not 
linked to income or unemployment status (U.S. Veterans 
Affairs Office of Inspector General 2005).  In fiscal year 
2004, approximately 2.5 million veterans received disability 
compensation, which is 10.2 percent of the total U.S. veteran 
population, and the average annual disability compensation 
payment was $8,378.  The ten percent disability-rating 
category is the largest with 30.6 percent of beneficiaries 
receiving compensation at this level in 2004 and only 8.4 
percent receiving 100 percent disability compensation (U.S. 
Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General 2005).
Veterans’ interest groups are especially active in the VDC 
program.  Certain veterans’ groups, such as the three groups 
included in this analysis – the American Legion, Disabled 
American Veterans (DAV), and Veterans of Foreign Wars of 
the United States (VFW), have a privileged relationship with 
the VA and play an important role in the eligibility claiming 
process by helping to attract clients, prepare claims, and 
represent claimants.  In fact, many veterans’ organizations 
have offices within state VA headquarters, which helps these 
groups serve their implementation role in the VDC program. 
For disability claiming purposes, certain veterans’ groups, 
including the three used in this analysis, are permitted to 
sponsor veterans’ service representatives who are recognized 
by the VA (U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs 2007). 
The service representatives of the veterans’ groups actively 
participate in service provision through their intake activities 
and their role as guides for applicants through the claiming 
process.
Despite being a federal program, VDC is administered in 
a decentralized fashion through VA regional offices in each 
state, one per state with three exceptions (CA has three offices 
and NY and PA have two).  Regional offices are not “regional” 
in the traditional sense but state level offices; thus, we refer 
to them as state VA offices.  The VDC claims for a particular 
state are processed at the state’s VA office by VA claims 
examiners.  The VA claims examiners develop, investigate, 
and authorize claims filed by veterans at the state’s VA office 
and are the street-level bureaucrats who play a focal role in 
implementing VDC eligibility determination (U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management 1962).
Decisions about veterans’ disability compensation are 
essentially state level decisions.  In this paper, we explore the 
measures of service delivery by state to determine whether the 
strength of veterans’ groups in a state have an impact on the 
implementation of the Veterans’ Disability Compensation 
program.  
Measures of Impact
We estimate the impact of veterans’ groups in each state on 
three different dimensions of VDC program implementation 
(i.e., demand, access, and effectiveness.)  
 Demand represents the level of demand for VDC benefits 
 (i.e., number of claims per state relative to the state’s 
 veteran population and number of denied claims that 
 veterans appeal).
 Access represents the accessibility of VDC benefits 
 permitted by the state VA office (i.e., percent of awarded 
 claims and the average disability rating for awarded 
 claims).
 Effectiveness represents the competence of the state VA 
 office in implementing the VDC program.  We focus 
 on two types of effectiveness, how quickly the 
 bureaucracy processes claims, e.g. the percent of claims 
 that are pending for over 120 days; and how accurate the 
 VA is in their determinations, e.g. the error rate.  In the 
 error rate, the VA does not separate errors on allowances 
 and denials; therefore, our measure captures overall 
 errors.
To measure the strength of veterans’ groups, we use the 
percentage of veterans in each state who have joined one of 
the three principal veterans groups – the American Legion, 
the Disabled American Veterans, and the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars.  These are the three largest congressionally chartered 
veterans’ organizations in the U.S. (U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs 2007).  
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We estimate the impact of the resources of veterans’ groups on 
the implementation of VDC using Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression and take into account other factors that would 
affect policy implementation, such as attorney representation, 
the percent of veterans’ living in the state who believe they 
have a disability, the size of the state population who are 
veterans and the average age of veterans living in the state. 
For a complete list of control variables and how we measure 
them, please see Keiser and Miller, forthcoming.   
 
Findings and Implications  
Demand for Government Benefits. Veterans’ groups significantly 
influence the rate at which veterans claim disability 
compensation, though not the rate at which they appeal 
unfavorable decisions.  One problem in many government 
programs is that those who meet the eligibility criteria do not 
seek assistance (Nelson 1980).  While we cannot tell whether 
increasing claims leads to a greater percent of veterans getting 
the services they need, getting veterans to apply for benefits is 
an important part of service delivery.  The positive effect on 
claim rates suggests that the influence of veterans’ groups in 
generating demand for benefits lies in mobilizing potential 
claimants and that well mobilized groups may provide 
superior outreach programs. This difference in the impact 
of veterans’ groups for claims and appeals may indicate that 
these groups focus more attention and energy on activating 
new claimants and focus less on mobilizing veterans who 
have already entered the system.  
In order to gain an understanding of the magnitude of 
the impact of veterans’ groups, we look at the impact of 
membership rates across the states by comparing claims rates 
in the lowest and highest membership states.  The model 
predicts that if a state like Nevada that had the lowest level 
of mobilization (9.51 percent) increased its membership 
to be more like North Dakota that had the highest level 
of mobilization (67.7 percent), Nevada would increase the 
claiming rate by 22.8 percent.  In Missouri, 22.7 percent of 
veterans are members of the three principal veterans’ groups. 
If veterans in Missouri joined VA interest groups at the same 
rate of North Dakota, the model predicts that the claim rate 
would increase by 17.7 percent.  
The findings also show that, in addition to the mobilization 
of veterans, the workload of individual claims examiners is 
inversely related to the claim rate, thought it does not impact 
the appeal rate.  This finding suggests that as the number 
of VA claims examiners increases, they have more time to 
provide information to potential claimants and encourage 
claiming.  
Access to Benefits. We find that the resources of veterans’ groups 
significantly increases award rates, though not the average 
disability rating.  The model predicts that shifting from the 
minimum membership rate in Nevada to the maximum in 
North Dakota would increases the award rate by 11 percent. 
If Missouri increased its membership rate to be more similar 
that of North Dakota, Missouri’s award rate would increase 
by 8.5 percent. 
 
Effective Implementation. While the strength of veterans’ 
groups do not affect the percent of cases that are pending 
over 120 days, VA offices in states in which veterans’ groups 
have greater resources make fewer errors than those in states 
in which veterans’ groups have fewer resources.  Moving 
from the minimum membership rate for veterans groups in 
Nevada (9.51 percent) to the maximum in North Dakota 
(67.7 percent) decreases error rate by 6.8 percent.  If Missouri 
increased its veteran mobilization to be more similar to that of 
North Dakota, the model predicts the error rate would decrease 
by 5.3 percent.  Because VDC error rates include errors of 
omission (i.e., wrongful denials), errors of commission (i.e., 
wrongful allowances), and inaccurate disability ratings, this 
finding suggests that these groups encourage the VA office 
to make better quality eligibility decisions either in general 
or perhaps by simply reducing wrongful denials.  It suggests 
that strong, well-mobilized veterans’ groups help VA offices 
secure greater resources from Washington, which lead to 
more effective VDC program implementation, and may also 
indicate that strong veterans’ groups use their influence to 
pressure the state VA offices to perform well.
Conclusion
Our findings make a contribution to real world concerns 
about the VDC program.  The implementation of the 
VDC program has been the focus of intense criticism for 
lack of consistency and poor performance in eligibility 
determinations.  Scholars, stakeholders, and practitioners have 
questioned why certain aspects of eligibility determination 
vary across the U.S. fifty states.  Our findings demonstrate 
that part of the explanation lies in variation in interest group 
strength across U.S. states.  In so far as stakeholders seek 
to improve accuracy in VDC eligibility determination and 
expand demand and access, especially in states with lower 
award rates, our study suggests that advocates for veterans in 
the U.S. would be well served by efforts to mobilize potential 
members to join veterans’ interest groups.
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